What is the Meaning of “Knowingly?”: Ohio Supreme Court Hears Oral Argument in Case of Man Who Struck and Killed Cleveland Firefighter

On February 11, the Ohio Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case of State v. Bissell. The Ohio Supreme Court must resolve what it means to act knowingly in Ohio.

In November 2022, two vehicles crashed on the Cleveland Memorial Shoreway. Police officers from the city of Cleveland and village of Bratenahl responded to the scene. They positioned their cruisers to block innermost and middle-left lanes and allowed traffic to use the two right lanes to bypass the accident. Although the officers had turned on their cruisers’ flashing lights, no officers were directing traffic. No cones were placed to aid in directing traffic, either.

Meanwhile, 40-year-old Leander Bissell, of Cleveland, was driving on the Shoreway when he encountered slow traffic. To avoid the traffic, Bissell maneuvered around parked police cruisers at a speed of 49 miles per hour on the berm. As Bissell approached the scene, firefighters Johnny Tetrick and Tony Truhillo, were crossing the highway after checking on a pickup truck involved in the accident.

Tetrick had stopped to pick up debris on the road when Bissell struck him. Bissell did not stop after striking Tetrick. Tetrick was transported to the hospital where he died from his injuries.

Bissell was indicted for aggravated vehicular homicide, felony murder, involuntary manslaughter, two counts of felonious assault, failure to comply with an officer’s order, and failure to stop at the scene of the accident. After a bench trial in July 2023, a Cuyahoga County judge found him guilty on all counts.

Bissell subsequently appealed to the Eighth District. The Eighth District reversed his conviction on his felonious assault charge — finding that the State failed to prove that Bissell knowingly committed the crime.

The trial court supported its determination that Bissell acted knowingly based on surrounding circumstances – the rate of speed of Bissell’s vehicle, police and fire department presence, merging traffic into the right-most lanes, and the blocking off the innermost and middle-left lanes. Bissell was aware of those circumstances, supporting a finding of knowing conduct. But the Eighth District ruled that the record supported the finding of reckless conduct.

“Knowledge of the surrounding circumstances and acting anyway disregarding a substantial risk is a hallmark of reckless conduct,” the Eighth District held. “Bissell ignored the surrounding circumstances and disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that first responders would be on the highway.” Thus, according to the Eighth District, Bissell’s conduct could not support a conviction for felonious assault.

The State of Ohio appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, arguing that the Eighth District supplanted the Model Penal Code (“MPC”) knowingly standard for the Ohio statutory standard, and that the Eighth District failed to apply the sufficiency of the evidence standard. On June 24, 2025, the Ohio Supreme Court agreed to hear oral arguments.

To be convicted of certain crimes, the State must prove that the defendant had the necessary mental state when committing the crime. There are numerous states of mind that could be required under Ohio criminal laws — such as intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently. The severity of the offense varies with the required state of mind.

This case centers around the correct standard of knowingly. As the State argues, a person acts knowingly when, “regardless of purpose, that person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.” The Eighth District, however, applied a different standard. One that, as the State argues, is more consistent with MPC and federal criminal law, providing that “knowing conduct means that the actor acts with a degree of certainty in one’s intention that a result will occur.”

In response, Bissell argued that the Eighth District applied the correct standard for knowing conduct. The knowingly standard requires the defendant to have knowledge that the conduct will probably result in the harm.

Rather, as Bissell’s lawyer argued, Bissell only acted recklessly, which requires a defendant to act “with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person’s conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature.”

At oral argument, the State — represented by both the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor and Ohio Attorney General — presented their argument that the Eighth District applied the incorrect standard.

Justice Jennifer Brunner asked the most questions on this issue during the State’s presentation. Her questions were directed at clarifying the knowingly standard and whether it included an element of probability. She went on to ask what evidence the trial court judge needs to make such a finding.

The State responded that it is important to look at the totality of the circumstances to determine the mental state of the offender — noting the failure to brake, slow down, and stop created sufficient inferences to support a finding the mental state of knowingly. As counsel for the State argued, “the reason why the Eighth District wiped away those valid inferences was because it applied the wrong standard of what it means to act knowingly, and possibly . . . applied the wrong level of what sufficiency review is.”

Meanwhile, the Ohio Supreme Court justices dominated the presentation by counsel for Bissell. Particularly, Justices Pat DeWine and Patrick Fischer emphasized that Bissell did not slow down or stop after hitting Tetrick. Chief Justice Sharon Kennedy expressed doubt at the argument that Bissell acted recklessly, asking whether it was reasonable for a driver to not expect a first responder to be in the road when maneuvering around a crash scene by driving on the berm.

Bissell’s counsel argued that these questions illustrated that the Eighth District did not err; the correct standard was recklessness. “This is a recklessness case. I know it’s difficult for people to get their heads around this because it’s a tragic result. This man made a mistake. It’s a tragedy for him. He was reckless.”

Justice Brunner appeared receptive to this argument. When Bissell’s counsel stated that no case law supports the State’s argument that Bissell’s conduct constituted knowingly conduct, Justice Brunner acknowledged State v. Trent, which was cited in Bissell’s brief to the Court. In that case — which was authored by Justice Brunner — a court of appeals found sufficient evidence to support a finding of reckless conduct where the defendant drove double the speed limit through the busy streets of Columbus, ran every red light, and did not stop after hitting a school bus containing students with disabilities.

Another issue discussed at length during oral argument was the reviewing standard the Eighth District applied in reaching its decision. The State argued that the Eighth District misapplied the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard — requiring a reviewing court to make all inferences in favor of the State. “It is a test of evidence production — not persuasion — that occurs in the lens of the light most favorable to the State,” the State argued during oral argument.

The first question asked by a Justice concerned the appropriate level of review. Justice Fischer asked the State whether this case needed to be sent back to the Eighth District to their application of their reviewing standard. Later, Justice DeWine stated that “this is mostly just a sufficiency of the evidence” issue. The State argued that the Eighth District applied a heightened standard of review, applying a de novo standard instead — viewing the case without deference to the lower court.

Justices Fischer and DeWine pressed Bissell’s counsel on this point as well. Towards the end of Bissell’s argument, Fischer asked, “Absolutely, case law is important . . . but aren’t we here to determine could a fact finder . . . find sufficient evidence to make this finding?” Bissell’s counsel maintained that, based on case law, the evidence in this case was not sufficient to apply the knowingly standard.

Whether the Ohio Supreme Court reverses the Eighth District’s decision has a significant impact on Bissell, who could serve a life sentence, rather than 3 to 11 years, in prison. More broadly speaking, the Ohio Supreme Court will clarify the correct standard for knowing conduct — impacting criminal cases and defendants throughout the State.

Ohio Court Watch will continue to monitor this case for updates.

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