The Case and the Law
In Z.J. v. R.M., the Ohio Supreme Court addressed how courts should interpret Ohio’s menacing-by-stalking statute when considering whether to issue a civil stalking protection order.
The case arose after Z.J. sought a civil stalking protection order against R.M. A magistrate granted the request, concluding that Z.J. only needed to show a belief that R.M. intended to cause him mental distress. R.M. appealed.
The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the magistrate’s decision. In doing so, it relied on its prior ruling in Bloom v. Macbeth, which held that a petitioner does not need to show that they actually experienced mental distress. Instead, the court stated that it is enough for the petitioner to believe the offender will cause physical harm or mental distress.
This interpretation placed the Fifth District in conflict with the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth District Courts of Appeals. Those courts have consistently held that a victim must experience actual mental distress before a civil stalking protection order may be issued.
As a result of this circuit split, the Ohio Supreme Court agreed to review the case.
The Question Before the Court
The Ohio Supreme Court was asked to review whether the menacing-by-stalking statute requires a victim to actually experience mental distress or to only believe that the stalker will cause the victim physical harm or mental distress, in order for a court to issue a civil stalking protection order.
The statute prohibits engaging in a pattern of conduct that knowingly causes another person to believe the offender will cause physical harm or causes mental distress. The dispute centered on whether the phrase “to believe” applies only to physical harm or also to mental distress.
Majority Opinion: Belief Applies to Both
In a 5–2 decision, the majority concluded that the statute allows courts to issue protection orders based on a victim’s belief that mental distress will occur, even if the distress has not yet been experienced.
The majority interpreted the statute as applying the phrase “to believe” to both physical harm and mental distress. Under this reading, an offender violates the statute by engaging in a pattern of conduct that causes a victim to believe either form of harm will result.
The court said this interpretation is consistent with the statute’s protective purpose and allows courts to intervene before harm escalates.
Dissenting Opinion: Distress Must Be Actual
Two justices — Chief Justice Sharon Kennedy and Justice Jennifer Brunner — dissented, arguing that the statute requires proof that mental distress has, in fact, been caused.
The dissent relied on the rule of lenity, a principle directing courts to resolve ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the accused. Under that approach, the dissent read the statute as requiring proof that the offender’s conduct caused actual mental distress, not just fear of future distress.
The dissent warned that allowing protection orders based on anticipated distress expands the statute beyond its intended scope and departs from traditional methods of statutory interpretation.
Impact of the Decision
Although the justices disagreed on how to read the statute, both sides acknowledged that it is intended to protect individuals from repeated and unwanted conduct.
The court’s ruling now sets a uniform standard across Ohio which is more victim friendly. Victims seeking civil stalking protection orders are not required to show that they are currently experiencing mental distress. A belief that the offender’s conduct will cause such distress is now sufficient for a court to issue a protection order.
The decision resolves years of conflicting appellate rulings and provides guidance to trial courts evaluating future requests for civil stalking protection orders.