Filing a Motion for a New Trial in Ohio
For many criminal defendants in the state of Ohio, Crim. R. 33 provides a glimmer of hope by setting forth the procedure to file a motion for a new trial. Per that rule, defendants must file their motion within 14 days after the verdict is rendered. However, there is an exception in instances where the defense has discovered new, material evidence that could not have, with reasonable diligence, been discovered and produced at trial.
Motions for a new trial based on the discovery of new evidence must be filed within 120 days from when the verdict was rendered. But what if the new evidence isn’t discovered within 120 days? In those situations, if the defendant can prove that they were unavoidably prevented from discovering the new evidence, the motion may be filed past the 120-day deadline. But when are defendants “unavoidably prevented” from discovering new evidence?
The Parsons Case
This was the precise issue raised in State v. Parsons, which the Ohio Supreme Court declined to hear. In that case, the defendant, Cullen Parsons, was charged with attempted murder, felonious assault, and improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle. At trial, the victim could identify the vehicle from which the shots came, but not the assailant. The prosecution relied on the testimony of a jailhouse informant who was the only witness to identify Parsons as the shooter. According to the informant, he had overheard Parsons admit to the shooting while they were incarcerated together. In 2016, Parsons was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 12 years in prison.
Seven years later, in 2023, Parsons filed a motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Parsons identified four pieces of evidence that he alleged he was unavoidably prevented from discovering: 1) a transcript of an interview between the informant and the State; 2) an audio recording of the same interview; 3) a police officer’s report regarding the interview; and 4) cell assignment records from the jail, which showed that Parsons and the informant were housed in different areas of the jail when the alleged conversations occurred.
The trial court initially denied Parsons’ motion. However, the appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard. Specifically, the appellate court found that the trial court skipped the initial issue of whether Parsons was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence, and that it solely decided whether the new evidence was material.
On remand, the trial court partially granted Parson’s motion for leave, holding that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the first three items of evidence, but not the cell-assignment records. The cell-assignment records were “known to have existed” and were not required to be provided, the court held. In the court’s view, because Parsons knew the informant would be testifying, and he knew that he didn’t have a conversation with the informant, it was up to Parsons to subpoena those records at the time the State sought to introduce them. The court held that it was not the State’s job to provide them pursuant to Brady v. Maryland.
Brady imposes a duty on the State to turn over all evidence that is material and favorable to the defense, regardless of whether the defense has requested it. Similarly, Brady applies to evidence known by the prosecutor, as well as evidence known to police, and it imposes a duty on the prosecutor to learn of any favorable evidence known by the government and turn it over to the defense.
Parsons argued that the failure to turn over evidence regarding the informant constituted a Brady violation, entitling him to a new trial. It was undisputed that the evidence was favorable to Parsons, because it showed that the State’s witness was not physically located near Parsons in the jail at the time when he supposedly heard Parsons confess to the shooting. Similarly, it was undisputed that the cell-assignment records were in the State’s possession at the time of the trial. However, because Parsons knew that the informant would be testifying, the court decided that he should have known to subpoena the jail’s cell-assignment records; consequently, the prosecution’s failure to turn those records over did not constitute a Brady violation and did not entitle Parsons to relief.
Unresolved Issues
This case could have been critical in clarifying the requirements to seek a new trial under Crim. R. 33(B) in Ohio. It also has extremely important implications in clarifying what the prosecutions’ duty to disclose is under Brady, as well as what duties a defendant may have in making their own defense. To what extent is it the prosecutor’s duty to investigate the evidence they choose to present? In this case, was it the prosecutor’s duty to investigate and prove that the jailhouse conversation occurred, or was it Parsons’ duty to show that it did not? At this time, the Ohio Supreme Court has declined to clarify.