A divided Ohio Supreme Court has overruled itself and expanded what prosecutors can charge when juvenile cases move to adult court. Before State v. Turner, 2026-Ohio-1996, prosecutors could pursue only charges for which the juvenile court found probable cause. Now, they may pursue any charge a grand jury returns.
Complicating matters, the General Assembly had already amended the juvenile bindover statute to write that limit into law before the Court decided Turner. In his dissent, Justice Pat Fischer called the ruling “profoundly unfair” to juveniles bound over under the old law whose appeals are still pending. Defendants whose appeals ended earlier got the benefit of the old rule, he explained, while those still on appeal won’t. Others see a broader problem.
“What is most surprising about the Turner decision is that the Court is directly overruling two of its prior decisions, even though the legislature has now amended the statute to codify those prior rulings,” said Jonathan Witmer-Rich, associate dean and co-director of the Criminal Justice Center at Cleveland State University College of Law. “I have never seen a Supreme Court, at the state or federal level, overrule prior statutory interpretation decisions that have since been codified by the legislature, dramatically changing the law but only on a very temporary basis.”
Tavonte Turner’s Story
According to court records, Tavonte Turner was 16 when he fatally shot Joseph Owens in Cleveland, Ohio in the summer of 2022. Prosecutors charged him with five counts in the Juvenile Justice Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas: aggravated murder, murder, and felonious assault, each with two firearm specifications; having a weapon while under disability; and improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle. Because of his age and the charges, Ohio law required the juvenile court to bind his case over to adult court if it found probable cause that he had committed the offenses. Id. at ¶ 4.
Following a hearing, the juvenile court found probable cause on every charge except having a weapon under disability. Id. at ¶ 5.It also found probable cause that Turner used a firearm commit the offenses. Id.
In adult court, a grand jury indicted Turner on the original five counts plus seven more. Id. at ¶ 6. Turner pleaded guilty to three: murder with a three-year firearm specification, attempted murder, and having a weapon while under disability. Id. The state dismissed the rest. Id. The court sentenced him to 25 years to life in prison for murder, plus a consecutive three years for the firearm specification, a consecutive seven years for attempted murder, and a concurrent three years for having a weapon while under a disability. Id. at ¶ 8.
The Stakes on Appeal
Turner appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals and raised several challenges. One of those, on subject matter jurisdiction in juvenile cases, reached the Ohio Supreme Court. Specifically, Turner argued that the adult court had no jurisdiction over his charges for attempted murder and having a weapon with a weapon because the juvenile court never found probable cause for them. Id. at ¶ 9.
His argument relied largely on two recent Ohio Supreme Court decisions, both from 2022. Id. In State v. Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, the Court held that an adult court cannot prosecute a juvenile for an offense on which the juvenile court found no probable cause. Then in State v. Burns, 170 Ohio St.3d 57, 2022-Ohio-4606, 208 N.E.3d 801, at ¶ 13, the Court held that an adult court may add new charge only if they are “rooted in” the acts charged in the juvenile complaint.
The Eighth District agreed with Turner. The attempted murder charge originated from Turner firing at a second person, not the person he killed. The juvenile court never heard evidence of that shooting, so the charge was not “rooted in” the acts in offenses alleged in the juvenile complaint. Turner, 2023-Ohio-2874 at ¶ 21. The court of appeals reversed the conviction.
The state appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.
Juvenile Court’s Findings No Longer Bind
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed 5-2. It overruled Smith, and it overruled Burns to the extent it applied to Smith.
The majority described the rule it was discarding: “In Smith, this Court held that when a case is transferred from juvenile court to adult court, the adult court has jurisdiction over only the offenses for which probable cause was found in the juvenile court or the offenses that are rooted in the offenses that were charged in the juvenile complaint.” Turner, 2026-Ohio-1996, ¶ 3, citing Smith at ¶ 44. Burns built on that reasoning, allowing new charges in adult court only when they were rooted in the acts charged in the juvenile complaint. Burns at ¶ 13.
The Turner majority concluded that Smith strayed from the statute’s plain language. Under the version of R.C. 2152.12(I) in effect when Turner committed his offenses, the Court held, a bindover transfers the entire case, including every act charged in the juvenile complaint. Turner, 2026-Ohio-1996, ¶ 27.
Writing for the majority, Justice Deters set out the new rule:
“The juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the case abate, and the adult court has jurisdiction as though the case had been initiated there. The adult court’s jurisdiction extends not only to offenses charged in the juvenile complaint but also to any offense for which the grand jury issues an indictment.” Id.
Put simply, once a case is bound over, the juvenile court’s findings no longer limit what prosecutors can charge. The majority based that rule on R.C. 2151.23(H), which governs how a case proceeds and lets the adult court treat it as though it started there.
Lawmakers Had Already Codified Smith
What makes this ruling standout for criminal law scholars like Witmer-Rich is that the General Assembly had already written Smith into law. Justice Fischer’s dissent notes that R.C. 2152.022, effective April 2023, defines a “case” in the bindover context as only the charges for which the juvenile court found probable cause. In doing so, lawmakers adopted the Smith majority’s reading. Turner, 2026-Ohio-1996, ¶ 44 (Fischer, J. dissenting). Justice Brunner’s dissent goes further. Once the legislature acted, she write, the court had no power to undo that choice. Id. at ¶ 68 (Brunner, J., dissenting).
The majority answered that it applied the law in effect when Turner committed his offenses. It added that the new statute would not change the outcome, because lawmakers left intact R.C. 2151.23(H)’s grant of jurisdiction over “another offense that is different from the offense charged.” Id. at ¶ 32.
Either way, the ruling’s hardest impact will be to juveniles charged under the old law whose appeals remain open. Fischer called that a serious injustice because juveniles whose appeals ended after Smith got its protection, while those still pending may not. Id. at ¶ 45-46 (Fischer, J., dissenting).
“That means, as the dissents point out, that the Turner decision will only impact a relatively small number of defendants,” Witmer-Rich said. “But for those defendants, it has a profound impact, and they will be treated differently from defendants charged either a few years earlier or a few years later.”
The Scope of Impact
The stakes of the ruling are especially high in Cuyahoga County, which is consistently among the top five in Ohio for juvenile case bindovers to adult court, according to ACLU Ohio. In 2023, Cuyahoga County prosecutors bound over 175 juveniles: 111 were mandatory and 64 were discretionary. That accounted for 33% of the state’s total bindovers that year, outpacing Franklin (12%), Stark (11%), Summit (9%), and Hamilton (5%).
As legal scholars noted, the ruling also shifts significant power away from the juvenile court. Before bindover, the juvenile court weighs the evidence and decides which charges have probable cause. Under Turner, those findings no longer limit the charges once the case transfers. The majority says that is the point. The juvenile court decides whether a case belongs in adult court, but not which charges follow it. Turner, 2026-Ohio-1996, ¶ 34-35.
Fischer’s dissent warns that under the majority’s rule, a prosecutor could charge a juvenile with theft to secure bindover, then indict on murder from a separate incident against a different victim. Id. at ¶ 65 (Fischer, J., dissenting). In effect, he argued, the new rule rewards undercharging in juvenile court.
Witmer-Rich pointed to Fischer’s position as a sign of how far the majority went. Fischer joined the dissent in Smith. Now he dissents from overruling it.
“It is remarkable that a justice who dissented in a case only a few years earlier is now arguing that decision should not be overruled,” Witmer-Rich said. “That shows how unusual the majority’s decision is in Turner.”