A recurring question for those who engage with the law: what purpose should the criminal justice system serve? Perspectives on that question often differ, reflecting the varied and deeply personal experiences individuals have with the system. Yet beneath those differing perspectives lies a shared expectation that the criminal justice system operates with sufficient legitimacy to hold individuals accountable for criminal conduct and deliver fair and just outcomes.
That response is not merely the mechanical shuffling of paperwork through courts and agencies, but a consequential exercise of state authority through which the legitimacy is measured, and public trust is either reinforced or diminished. That commitment is tested in cases involving serious offenses, particularly sexual assaults. In such cases, procedural mechanisms, most notably plea agreements, can dilute accountability by resolving allegations of grave criminal conduct without outcomes proportionate to the harm inflicted.
The balance between accountability and efficiency becomes especially fraught in the context of sexual assault prosecutions. Sexual offenses constitute some of the most severe harms recognized by the law, inflicting profound and lasting trauma on victims while undermining the sense of safety that sustains communities. Under Ohio law, a conviction for rape carries a mandatory minimum prison term of three years. When the victim is a child, the gravity of that harm is magnified, and in such cases, sentences are typically far longer. Evidently, the legislature deems rape, and especially child rape, to demand substantial incarceration and unequivocal accountability. Sexual offense cases, however, present unique challenges for the justice system. Underreporting, recantations, and the emotional toll of testimony complicate prosecution. Delayed disclosure continued contact with the accused, fragmented memories, and inconsistencies likewise convolute cases, and such aspects of victim testimony may be viewed as fabrication rather than trauma responses—reflecting not only evidentiary difficulty but also broader societal assumptions that jurors inevitably bring into the courtroom. Together, these factors mount uncertainty even when prosecutors believe the evidence is strong.
Plea agreements serve legitimate purposes within the criminal justice system. They offer certainty and finality, they conserve resources, and they can circumvent victim re-traumatization. And as they shape the form that accountability takes, they may also ensure that defendants receive supervision, treatment, or restriction in circumstances, even where the outcome of a trial is uncertain. Prosecutors must frequently make decisions under imperfect circumstances. A plea agreement is not merely a mechanism for compromise; it presupposes a factual basis sufficient to support a factfinder’s conviction had the matter proceeded to trial. When a plea agreement fails to do this is when concerns should arise. In some cases, allegations of sexual abuse are resolved through pleas to offenses such as child endangerment, assault, or disorderly conduct, resulting in an adjudication that altogether removes sexual conduct and no longer legally reflects a sexual offense. The defendant is punished, but the law does not label the conduct as sexual abuse.
The system thus achieves procedural closure while risking a diminished expression of the harm. This dynamic is illustrated in State v. Deyarmin and State v. Holloway, Ohio appellate decisions reviewing sentencing conditions imposed after negotiated plea agreements.
In Deyarmin, the defendant was indicted on multiple counts of rape and gross sexual imposition involving a child under ten years old, along with sexually violent predator specifications. The record reflects compelling evidence supporting the indictment. The victim’s mother reported discovering Deyarmin in the act of sexually abusing her child. Forensic testing later identified Deyarmin’s DNA on the outside of the child’s underpants.
Similarly, in Holloway, the defendant was indicted on charges of rape, gross sexual imposition, and kidnapping involving his nine-year-old stepdaughter. The evidence indicated sexual abuse, with the victim reporting explicit sexual contact, including genital touching, on multiple occasions, and DNA appeared to corroborate her account.
Neither of these cases appear to be defined by evidentiary ambiguity, and, if proven, these facts describe sexual violence of the most serious kind. If taken to trial, one could predict that, based on the evidence on its face, the state could have met their burden of proof. Nevertheless, both of these cases were resolved through plea agreements. Those plea agreements did not involve any sexual conduct.
Now, to be clear, criminal adjudication proceeds from the presumption of innocence, and the existence of inculpatory evidence does not eliminate the possibility of acquittal or innocence. Above all, it is the government’s burden to prove each case, and each defendant’s guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt. A negotiated plea agreement may reflect a variety of factors, including evidentiary uncertainty, the practical and emotional complexities of trial particularly in cases involving vulnerable witnesses and the structural dynamics inherent in the plea-bargaining process. Because these matters were resolved without trial, the evidentiary record was not subjected to full adversarial testing through cross-examination and judicial findings of fact. Accordingly, while the pleas represent legally valid resolutions, they do not provide the same degree of factual development as a contested trial.
Even an innocent person may rationally accept a negotiated plea. The uncertainty of trial, combined with the potential for severe mandatory penalties if convicted, creates substantial coercive pressure. Faced with the possibility of decades of imprisonment and the social consequences attached to a sexual-offense conviction, a defendant who maintains innocence may nevertheless plead to a lesser non-sexual offense to avoid catastrophic risk. And a good defense attorney would seek such a plea in advocacy for their client, whether innocent or guilty. In short, a plea agreement may or may not accurately reflect reality.
Of course, concerns escalate where a defendant pleads to a non-sexual offense when the accusations of sexual conduct are purported to be true. Because neither Deyarmin nor Holloway were argued before a jury, the truth remains undisclosed. However, assuming the allegations were based in fact, both of these cases resulted in plea agreements that defy a core purpose of the criminal justice system.
Deyarmin’s agreement amended a rape charge to abduction, a third-degree felony, and dismissed the remaining sexual charges. Abduction does not require proof of sexual conduct and is not a lesser included offense of rape. The amended charge eliminated mandatory prison exposure and removed the statutory consequences that ordinarily attach to child sexual assault. At sentencing, however, the trial court expressed concern about Deyarmin’s access to children, noting that he had a large family, including multiple grandchildren. The court ultimately required Deyarmin to be supervised by the sex-offender unit and to complete sex-offender assessment and treatment. These conditions reflect a clear recognition of the harm involved and the risk of reoffending. However, his conviction did not similarly address these concerns. The system simultaneously acknowledged the seriousness of the conduct through supervision and treatment while minimizing it through the offense of conviction.
When Deyarmin later failed to complete sex-offender treatment, the court revoked community control and imposed a nine-month prison sentence. On appeal, Deyarmin argued that the court lacked authority to require sex-offender treatment, because he had not been convicted of a sexual offense. The appellate court rejected that argument on procedural grounds. Although the law was formally followed, the cases reveal a structural disconnect. The conviction no longer reflected the sexual nature of the conduct, and whatever accountability existed came from conditions attached to the plea, rather than the offense of conviction itself. As a result, conduct supported by evidence of child rape produced limited incarceration and a judgment that did not accurately describe what occurred.
A similar pattern appeared in Holloway. Despite the sexually driven accusations, Holloway was permitted to plead guilty to aggravated assault, a non-sexual offense. Moreover, aggravated assault is a mitigation offense requiring sudden passion or rage brought on by serious provocation by the victim—a framework premised on some degree of victim responsibility. Applied to a nine-year-old child, the plea not only avoided the mandatory sentencing scheme but mischaracterized the nature of the harm and implied a form of victim culpability that cannot exist. Holloway received minimal jail time, followed by community control, court-imposed sex-offender assessment and treatment. He was also permitted to return to the same family environment, including association with the alleged victim. In both Deyarmin and Holloway, the plea agreements avoided the mandatory prison consequences that Ohio law attaches to rape. In both cases, defendants faced minimal incarceration despite conduct that, if convicted as charged, would have called for years of imprisonment. The courts’ imposition of treatment and supervision demonstrates that the system understood the seriousness of the harm. Yet, by allowing convictions that erase the sexual nature of the offenses, the system sends a conflicting message. The harm was acknowledged but not fully accounted for.
Accountability is not only rehabilitative. It is expressive. It communicates condemnation, reinforces societal norms, and affirms the community’s commitment to protecting children. A conviction for abduction or for aggravated assault in this context fails to perform that function. Collateral conditions serve a different expressive function than the offense of conviction itself.
But these cases reveal that the way in which a case gets resolved matters as much as whether it is, in fact, resolved. When negotiated resolutions substantially alter the legal characterization of alleged conduct, the adjudicative outcome does not mirror the factual allegations presented in the record. The law may close the file, but the outcome no longer reflects what may have occurred, nor does it fully express society’s condemnation of harm.
Justice is not measured solely by efficiency or finality. It is measured by whether the system’s response aligns with the gravity of the offense, affirms victims’ dignity, and reinforces shared norms that protect the most vulnerable. When sexual violence results in convictions that obscure, rather than acknowledge, the harm, accountability becomes conditional, and public trust begins to fray.
These cases, therefore, warrant careful reflection. They highlight the difficult judgments prosecutors and courts must make in resolving serious criminal allegations, while also raising broader questions about how negotiated outcomes shape the system’s ability to communicate accountability. The concern is not that compromise is inherently improper, but that in some circumstances, compromise may begin to resemble distortion—when the legal characterization of conduct no longer aligns with the gravity of the harm involved, and when “some justice” risks falling short of what the law is meant to express.
This concern also implicates prosecutorial responsibility. A prosecutor may conclude that serious conduct occurred while also determining that the evidence may not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In such circumstances, a negotiated resolution to a lesser offense may be appropriate. However, when the government accepts a conviction that does not correspond to the charged conduct, questions arise regarding the prosecution’s assessment of provability and culpability. Conversely, offering a plea to a substantially less serious offense, while maintaining that more severe conduct occurred, raises concerns related to consistency, charging discretion, and public confidence in the criminal justice system. Accordingly, the situation presents an ethical and procedural question: When a prosecutor determines the alleged conduct cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, is the proper course to pursue a lesser charge or to dismiss the case?
This discussion does not seek to condemn plea bargaining as a practice. Rather, it encourages careful, context-specific scrutiny when negotiated resolutions substantially alter the legal characterization of serious alleged conduct. It also asks whether a system designed to obtain justice can do so without sacrificing meaningful accountability for those who violate society’s most fundamental obligations.